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This study explores how information helps housing consumers make informed decisions and 
discusses potential market outcomes. We analyse the interaction between the disclosure of 
information on property conditions and the disparity between home sellers’ willingness to 
accept (WTA) and home buyers’ willingness to pay (WTP). Three hypotheses are derived and 
validated through field experimental investigation within the property market. We find that the 
WTA–WTP disparity exists. The discussed policy instrument for information disclosure 
appears to function as expected. The WTA–WTP disparity is considerably reduced after 
information disclosure, and market liquidity and efficiency are improved. This study is an 
important complement to prior research on how information changes the behaviour of 
consumers in housing markets. Findings can inform the central government about the wide use 
of smart disclosure in the near future, as well as the scope, format and structure of information 
to be supplied to general housing consumers.  
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“Smarter Information, Smarter Consumers”? Insights into the Housing Market 
 
1. Introduction 
“Smarter information, smarter consumers”, the Nobel laureate and behavioural economist 
Richard Thaler told us. The idea of this statement summarises and has guided government 
efforts and practice in recent years. In the US, the disclosure of products, services and other 
information in many sectors is required by federal laws and regulations. Such requirement 
allows the release of information intelligently and efficiently and ensures the public’s easy 
access to and use of available information. In the UK, central government has been undertaking 
programs to	provide individuals with access to information, thereby empowering consumers in 
their decision-making process. Efforts to disclose information and potential opportunities can 
be seen in the finance, education, health care, energy and other private sectors.  
 
By definition, an efficiently functioning market requires full information. The housing market 
is no exception. Homeowners are known to have a natural information advantage over potential 
buyers in housing markets. Information asymmetries and gaps between sellers and buyers are 
well-identified in the housing sector (e.g. Votsis & Perrels 2016; Rutherford et al. 2007; 
Lützkendorf & Speer 2005; Kurlat & Stroebel 2015; Walsh & Mui 2017, Eichholtz et al. 2016; 
Ling et al. 2018). Many previous studies focused only on how information asymmetry affects 
the property transaction price, which is the final outcome of a real estate transaction. The 
present study complements prior research by analysing the interaction between the disclosure 
of information on property conditions and the disparity between the willingness to accept 
(WTA) of home sellers and the willingness to pay (WTP) of home buyers (referred to as the 




There are good reasons to believe that the WTA–WTP disparity is of great importance in 
housing markets, and the disclosure of property information helps in reducing such disparity. 
First, if the value divergence between WTA of a seller and WTP of a buyer exists, one can only 
arrive at a price range estimation of the fair value, which is normally lie between WTA and 
WTP. Non-economic variation in the market power of buyers and sellers may move observed 
prices closer to WTA or WTP, making economic assessment of the movement of fundamental 
values over time difficult. Moreover, the existence of a time varying WTA–WTP disparity 
makes performance measures based on WTA potentially misleading. Mis-valuation of property 
prices also has potential consequences for lenders, particularly if valuations are above fair value. 
 
Second, if the WTA–WTP disparity is substantial, then the affected parties (e.g. home sellers 
and buyers) need to go through a long process of bargaining and negotiation to reach an 
agreement, which may keep an asset on the market for a long time and make market players 
reluctant to trade (Al-Ubaydli & List, 2016). The presence of such a disparity impedes efficient 
market exchanges (Knetsch, 1989). As a result, such a condition undermines market efficiency 
(i.e. the ability of the market to allocate goods efficiently), diminishes transaction volumes, 
reduces transaction information and poses direct implications for market liquidity (Al-Ubaydli 
& List, 2016; Knetsch, 1989; Fisher, Gatzlaff, Geltner, & Haurin, 2003; 2004), and potentially 
reducing household mobility with wider economic efficiency consequences (Ferreira, Gyourko, 
& Tracy, 2010). 
 
In housing markets, consumers become involved with housing transactions only a limited 
number of times in their lifetime. During a housing transaction, market players are likely to use 
their own limited information, limited experience and heuristic thinking to judge the value of 
a property. With information asymmetry and other factors at play, consumers may ultimately 
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arrive at a biased housing decision which gives rise to differences between their perceived 
property value and a reasonable price (Chang, Chao, & Yeh, 2016; Eerola & Lyytikäinen, 2015). 
Consequently, either the market pays for the consequences (e.g. market failure: when the 
property values perceived by buyers are significantly lower than any fair value, transaction 
activities will be much reduced) or less-informed consumers pay for the consequences (e.g. 
when they purchase a property at a high price or the quality of a property is not worth the price 
they paid for it).  
 
Therefore, governments should make an effort to correct any existing information asymmetries 
and gaps for the benefit of consumers and housing markets. The disclosure of property 
information can potentially reduce valuation disparity, enhance fair property valuation and 
thereby promote efficiency in the property market. 
 
Our research begins by identifying the existence of WTA–WTP disparities in housing markets. 
Using ex-post transaction data is insufficient to identify WTA–WTP disparities because the 
WTAs of sellers and WTPs of buyers are usually unobservable. Although real estate agencies 
hold relevant information, such information is subject to manipulation for marketing purposes 
(Zhang et al., 2015). Verifying the accuracy and robustness of results is difficult when only 
listing information is used (Yavas & Sirmans, 2005). Therefore, experimental techniques are 
utilised in this study to collect first-hand data.  
 
We conduct field experiments to identify WTA–WTP disparities in housing markets. These 
experiments are thus different from those conducted previously. Specifically, previous 
experiments were usually conducted in classroom settings. Items of trivial values (e.g. mugs 
and pens) were utilised as instruments for the participants (usually college students). Given the 
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uniqueness and substantial value of the research item (i.e. houses) in the current study, we 
identify whether WTA–WTP disparities exist using actual houses on the market, house owners 
and potential home buyers. 
 
In what follows, we analyse the interaction between the disclosure of information on property 
conditions and the WTA–WTP disparity in housing markets. Specifically, we test if 
information asymmetry between sellers and buyers is one of the major forces that drive such a 
disparity in housing markets. If so, can a policy instrument on information disclosure function 
as intended to reduce the WTA–WTP disparity?  
 
Since California enacted the residential real estate property disclosure law, empirical studies 
have tested and shown the importance of information to the decision making of housing 
consumers. These studies have revealed how property transaction prices and the market are 
affected after the disclosure of information on past housing transactions (Eerola & Lyytikäinen 
2015; Zhang et al. 2015), structural housing characteristics (Lützkendorf & Speer 2005; Nanda 
& Ross 2012), neighbourhood housing characteristics (Fiva & Kirkebøen, 2011; Kurlat & 
Stroebel, 2015) and environmental dis-amenity (Votsis & Perrels 2016; Walsh & Mui 2017; 
and Pope 2008a). Our study justifies the information disclosure laws from a different aspect. 
We focus on the interaction between information disclosure and the WTA–WTP disparity. Such 
disparities carry further information because it indicates how transaction prices could be 
derived and how long the transaction process will take. Specifically, the WTA–WTP disparity 
has important implications on the market from the following two dimensions.  
 
First, transaction price: the price at which a property is transacted must lie between the WTA 
of a seller and the WTP of a potential buyer (Fisher et al., 2003). Therefore, all else being equal, 
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property transaction prices are likely to increase if home buyers increase their WTP, as in the 
cases of Nanda and Ross (2012) and Fiva and Kirkebøen (2011). Similarly, property prices may 
drop if home buyers are willing to pay less, as in the cases of Votsis and Perrels (2016), Walsh 
and Mui (2017) and Pope (2008a), or if homeowners are willing to sell their property at a 
reduced price.  
 
Second, market liquidity: we consider market liquidity as the ease with which goods can be 
transacted. Within a certain period, numerous transactions indicate that the market has 
considerable liquidity. However, if the WTA–WTP disparity is substantial, then properties may 
be retained on the market for a long time, because it takes time for home sellers and buyers to 
reach an agreement on price. In other words, the WTA–WTP disparity, if any, essentially 
diminishes the number of transactions and poses direct implications for market liquidity (Fisher 
et al., 2003; Knetsch, 1989; Al-Ubaydli & List 2016, Chung & Hrazdil 2010; Chordia et al. 
2008). Therefore, our analysis of the interaction between information disclosure and WTA–
WTP disparity enables us to view the housing market from a dynamic perspective. 
 
To facilitate the investigation of the interaction between information disclosure and WTA–
WTP disparity, we incorporate information asymmetry materials in our field experiments and 
compare the disparities obtained before and after information disclosure scenarios. China is an 
ideal location to conduct experiments because the Chinese government has not enacted any 
form of seller information disclosure laws. The reaction of housing decision makers in China 
to the release of information during the transaction process would be more realistic than that 
of housing decision makers in other countries who have already adapted to policy instruments 
for information disclosure. Consequently, a before-after information treatment experiment can 
be implemented in China. The responses of decision makers (i.e. WTA or WTP) before and 
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after private information is released within a controlled environment can be observed, and the 
decision-making process can be recorded.  
 
This research finds that, on average, sellers’ WTA is significantly greater than buyers’ WTP. 
Home buyers are usually not well informed about property conditions. They may potentially 
reduce their relative WTP to compensate for any information uncertainty and future risk, 
thereby widening the WTA–WTP disparity in the housing market. However, policy instruments 
such as disclosure of information on property conditions not only closes the information gap 
between buyers and sellers, but also narrows the gap between perceived risk and the actual risk 
that buyers are facing. The additional information enables buyers to reduce the risk 
compensation they previously required and adjust their valuation towards what might be 
considered a fair property value. On the other hand, market transparency makes home sellers—
the informed party—unable to take advantage of the private information they hold. Hence, any 
deviations of their WTA from the fair market price are reduced. As a result, the disclosure of 
information on property conditions functions as intended. That is, it generates smart housing 
consumers, reduces the WTA–WTP disparity during the transaction process and motivates 
buyers and sellers to close deals quickly. These results can potentially improve market liquidity 
and enhance market efficiency. 
 
By providing an experimental investigation into how information changes consumer behaviour 
in the important but unique housing sector, we contribute to the literature on consumer 
behaviour, behavioural economics, experimental economics, and housing economics. Previous 
WTA–WTP disparity experiments use goods of trivial value (e.g. a pen, chocolate or mug) as 
instruments. Goods or entitlements of substantial value, on which the WTA–WTP disparity 
would pose telling implications outside the lab (e.g. houses), have not been extensively studied. 
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The current work addresses this deficiency by providing a unique identification of the WTA–
WTP disparity in housing markets and investigating how the disparity interacts with the release 
of information. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the interaction 
between the disclosure of information on property conditions and the WTA–WTP disparity in 
the housing market. The findings of this study can benefit all housing market players and 
policymakers. The insights gained from our research can potentially increase public awareness 
of the benefits and importance of policy interventions such as information release. Results can 
also inform the central government on the potentially wide use of smart disclosure, as well as 
the scope, format and structure of information to be supplied to general consumers.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. A literature review of studies on the WTA–
WTP disparity and derivation of testable hypotheses is presented in Section 2. Section 3 
illustrates the experimental strategy. The experiment results and empirical findings are 
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Literature review on WTA–WTP disparity and testable hypotheses 
Experimental evidence obtained in the past 50 years confirms that sellers’ WTA is higher than 
buyers’ WTP is for the same good. The WTA–WTP ratio obtained from previous experiments 
ranges from less than 5 to more than 100 (see Tunçel & Hammitt 2014 for a meta-analytical 
review on the WTA–WTP disparity). The instrument utilised in previous experiments covers 
ordinary private goods (Brown & Cohen 2015; Kahneman et al. 1990; Morrison 1997), 
environment assets (Bishop et al. 1983; Shefrin & Caldwell 2001), time (Ortona & Scacciati 
1992), health- and safety-related goods (Chapman & Johnson 1995; Gerking et al. 1988), 
lotteries (Eisenberger & Weber 1995; Peters et al. 2003; Nash & Rosenthal, 2014) and other 
public or non-market goods (Garbacz & Thayer 1983). Horowitz and Mcconnell (2002) and 
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Tunçel and Hammitt (2014) conclude that the WTA–WTP ratio is small when the instrument 
used in the experiment is close to ordinary private goods when all other conditions are equal.  
 
However, a unique but important type of instrument, namely, real estate, is overlooked and 
under-researched in previous experimental studies. A good understanding of the disparity 
between home sellers’ WTA and home buyers’ WTP is essential because it could explain the 
movement of property transaction volumes, the liquidity of property transactions and 
underlying housing cycles. Currently, only a few experiments have asked respondents about 
their WTA or WTP through a real estate-related instrument. Paraschiv and Chenavaz (2011) 
were the first to apply experimental techniques to the housing market and elicit respondents’ 
evaluations on resale houses. However, their work did not comprehensively discuss the WTA–
WTP disparity. He and Asami (2014) and Bao and Gong (2016) conducted WTA–WTP 
experiments on land price and resale property in Beijing, respectively. They confirmed the 
existence of the WTA–WTP disparity in land and housing markets. However, the instruments 
(i.e. land and houses) in these studies are generic and hypothetical. According to Sayman and 
Öncüler (2005), the WTA–WTP ratio is larger when participants have physical ownership of 
the instrument than when participants are given hypothetical ownership only. Considering the 
external validity of experiments, we aim to identify whether the WTA–WTP disparity exists in 
the housing market using actual houses on the market, house owners and potential home buyers. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The WTA–WTP disparity exists in the housing market. 
  
Standard economic theory predicts that in the case of a limited income effect, sellers’ WTA and 
buyers’ WTP for the same product are generally identical (Willig, 1976). However, the WTA–
WTP disparities observed in previous experiments are too large to be explained by the income 
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effect. Previous studies sought alternative explanations for such disparities from different 
perspectives. On the basis of psychology and behavioural economics, Thaler (1980) coined the 
term ‘endowment effect’ to explain why sellers’ WTA usually exceeds buyers’ WTP. Although 
the endowment effect explanation contradicts the Coase theorem, it is confirmed by laboratory 
experimental evidence when the income effect and transaction costs are absent. According to 
prospect theory, this finding is an evidence of reference dependence and loss aversion. Losses 
loom larger than gains do. In a typical exchange, to compensate for the potential loss and the 
pain of losing belongings, owners who are endowed with goods are more likely to ascribe 
additional value to such items than those without such goods. These psychological factors are 
considered the most robust explanation for the WTA–WTP disparity from the behavioural 
aspect (see Ericson and Fuster 2014 for a review).   
 
However, a typical transaction is usually accompanied by asymmetric information between 
agents (Casey, 1995). This scenario was not considered in previous studies because most, if 
not all, the experiments distributed exactly the same information on goods to the participants 
and information asymmetry was assumed to be not an issue. However, such an assumption is 
strong for a real estate-related instruments. Given that properties have heterogeneous 
characteristics (i.e. structural, locational and neighbourhood characteristics), sellers usually 
have more information on their own house than buyers do (Wong et al. 2012; Pope 2008b). The 
issue of information asymmetry in the housing market and its effect on liquidity (Wong et al., 
2012) and house price movements (Kurlat & Stroebel, 2015) were discussed in previous studies. 
However, none of those studies established a direct link between information asymmetry and 
home sellers’ WTA (or buyers’ WTP) and captured the manner by which information 
asymmetry influences the WTA–WTP disparity in the housing market. With these 
considerations in mind and by taking note of the internal validity of experiments, we seek to 
12 
	
determine whether the observed WTA–WTP disparity in a market with heterogeneous assets 
and differentially informed parties is driven by information asymmetry. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Information asymmetry affects the WTA–WTP disparity in the housing market. 
 
If the supply side cannot meet the information required by the demand side, then the WTP 
value of the demand side should be substantially reduced. However, information disclosure is 
a potential means to correct this information gap in the housing market. Since the 
implementation of seller disclosure laws by each state in the US, the release of information has 
helped housing consumers make more informed decisions. For example, after information on 
school quality is disclosed to the public, housing consumers absorb such information promptly. 
Buyers push their WTP to a high level shortly after the release of information (Fiva & 
Kirkebøen 2011). Nanda & Ross (2012) and Lützkendorf & Speer (2005), among others, 
examined the effect of disclosing detailed structural housing characteristics (e.g., property 
quality, condition, or performance of buildings) on the housing market. Homebuyers may 
require a large risk premium, which is usually reflected by a low bid price when they face any 
information ambiguity and uncertainty. The indicators of property quality and building 
performance, however, can substantially reduce such uncertainty and help facilitate an 
informed decision making process for housing consumers (Lützkendorf & Speer 2005). On 
average, the risk premium that homebuyers applied to compensate for information uncertainty 
is reduced by 6.4% in US metropolitan areas. As a result, average property transaction price 
increases (Nanda & Ross, 2012). Similarly, the effect of disclosing locational housing 
characteristics on the residential real estate market was also discussed. Standard locational 
characteristics, such as distance to the nearest metro station, park, or supermarket, are publicly 
available to all citizens. The non-obvious information on environmental dis-amenity, such as 
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airport noise, flood risk, and contaminated sites that housing consumers do not usually have 
access to, attracted considerable attention (Votsis & Perrels 2016; Walsh & Mui 2017; Pope 
2008a). In general, the disclosure of environmental dis-amenities reduces property values. 
 
We postulate that, for any information that the supply side holds and is previously unpublished 
to the demand side, the release of information that home buyers deem desirable would increase 
their WTP. For the release of information deemed undesirable, owners and buyers would adjust 
their WTA and WTP, respectively. However, in the sale of the property, the magnitude of the 
value adjustment of owners may be larger than that of potential buyers. In both cases, the WTA–
WTP disparity is reduced.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The release of information enables consumers to make informed decisions, 
thereby reducing the WTA–WTP disparity in the housing market. 
 
3. Experimental strategy 
Most existing WTA–WTP disparity experiments were conducted in classroom settings, and 
items of trivial values were utilised as instruments for participants (usually college students). 
Similar information was distributed to participants acting as buyers or sellers. The experimental 
setting of the current study is different from those of previous studies. The data utilised in this 
study are obtained from an online field experiment that uses big data on the Chinese resale 
housing market. The instruments utilised in the field experiment are actual properties on the 
market that home sellers own and intend to sell. The participants are real home owners and 
potential home buyers in Beijing, China who have indicated an interest to sell or buy resale 
properties by registering on a public platform that belongs to the China Index Academy, one of 
the largest real estate databanks in China. This platform is the same one used to conduct official 
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surveys and collect official statistics on Chinese housing consumers. Therefore, we use this 
platform to recruit our experiment participants. 
 
The experiment consists of two sequential stages that target homeowners and potential buyers 
in the market. Stage one (sellers’ experiment) is designed for home sellers. In this stage, the 
information on the properties that sellers intend to sell (e.g. listed price, location and lot size) 
is collected. This stage is followed by Stage two (buyers’ experiment) which is designed for 
buyers. In this stage, buyers are randomly assigned selected real properties obtained from Stage 
one. The buyers’ experiment is conducted on the basis of these assignments. In both stages, the 
experiment participants (i.e. home owners and potential home buyers) are asked to complete a 
three-part questionnaire. Parts A, B and C provide data on identification, scenarios and 
background information, respectively. The experimental procedures of Stages one (sellers’ 
experiment) and two (buyers’ experiment) are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Part A which is labelled ‘identification’ constitutes the first part of the sellers’ and buyers’ 
experiment. Part A in Stage one (sellers’ experiment) has 19 questions that aim to identify if a 
participant is a potential seller and to collect basic information on the property that this 
participant intends to sell (Table 1). Specifically, in Stage one, the experiment terminates when 
the participants do not meet the selection criteria established in this study (e.g. if property 
owners indicate that they do not have any plans of selling their properties in the near future, if 
the property for sale is not located in the areas covered by the experiment or if the property that 
an owner holds is a villa or an affordable home, etc.). Part A in Stage two presents 15 questions 
to identify whether a participant is a potential buyer who meets the criteria set in this study. For 
instance, the experiment will not proceed if a participant does not plan to buy a resale property 
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in the near future, already owns more than two properties2, does not have the hukou of Beijing 
and has paid for tax and/or social securities in Beijing for less than five years or is not looking 
for a property located in the areas covered by the experiment. Several checkpoints were 
established to check the consistency of the participants’ responses and to confirm further the 
ecological validity of the experiment. For example, the experiment will also terminate if a 
participant provides conflicting answers during the experiment. We use these selection criteria 
to filter eligible sellers and buyers. Our participants are then randomly selected from the 
population of eligible sellers or buyers via the China Index Academy platform. All participants 
who meet the criteria set in this study and pass all the consistency checks are instructed to 
answer Part B of the questionnaire. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Part B, which is labelled ‘scenarios’, requires participants to follow a sequence of scenarios 
that detail the current market price, historical information, market expectations, information 
asymmetry materials and others. The WTA or WTP values of participants are elicited from their 
responses. 
 
Initially, home sellers are given current market information (see Seller.Scenario A) which is 
presented as the average price and price range of properties in the same neighbourhood with a 
similar unit type. The given average price and price range of a property are based on big data 
of the resale property market in Beijing and linked to the official statistics collected by the 
China Index Academy. 
 
Second, historical information such as the prices two and four years ago is provided in the 
																																																						
2 According to home purchase restrictions in Beijing, housing consumers who already own more than two 
properties are not eligible to purchase another property.  
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second and third scenarios, respectively. The first three scenarios aim to establish an existing 
up-market condition by using current market information and historical information. A similar 
design of the questionnaire and scenarios can be found in the work of Baucells, Weber and 
Welfens (2011) and that of Paraschiv and Chenavaz (2011). The increase rates of property 
prices provided in Seller.Scenarios B and C are in accordance with the average increase in the 
Beijing housing market during the past two and four years.  
 
Third, the participants are given an expectation-based up/down/stable market scenario. The 
design of this question is in line with the idea of the reference–dependent preference model 
proposed by Koszegi and Rabin (2006). In their model, the reference points are considered 
recent expectations of future outcomes. In other words, reference points can be determined 
by expected future outcomes or predictions. Similar conclusions can be found in the work of 
Morewedge and Giblin (2015). The importance of consumers’ expectations in property value 
formation was also emphasised by Thanos and White (2017). Therefore, participants are 
asked about their expectations regarding the property market in Beijing. Thereafter, an 
up/down/stable market condition is assigned to them on the basis of their response. 
 
Fourth, a hypothetical scenario is given to home sellers to determine whether they update their 
WTA after the implementation of the policy instrument (e.g. suppose that the information 
disclosure law is in place and owners should consider the influence of any private information 
they hold such as structural defect). In this study, historical price information and 
neighbourhood characteristics (e.g. school catchment area) are given to participants. Standard 
locational characteristics are considered public information that can be accessed equally by 
home sellers and buyers. Environmental externalities are homogeneous across the study areas. 
Therefore, private information refers to structural characteristics (especially structural defects) 
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as desirable structural characteristics are disclosed for marketing purposes. The rationale 
behind this hypothetical scenario is consistent with that of Wong, Yiu and Chau (2012). In 
particular, the structural defect used in this field experiment is the potential aging problem of 
electrical cables, which is considered as one of the biggest latent problems when purchasing 
resale properties in China because the quality of electrical cables used by real estate developers 
various greatly.  
  
A standard randomised controlled trial (RCT) may use a between-subject design, in which 
Seller.Scenario E is given to participants in the treatment group only. Any observed 
difference between the responses from the control and those from the treatment groups 
should help us determine whether the treatment/intervention has functioned as intended. 
However, because of the uniqueness of the housing sector, we provide Scenario E to all home 
sellers in this field experiment and then compare the responses of sellers before and after the 
scenario is given. This strategy is rooted in the heterogeneous characteristics of the properties. 
If home sellers are divided into two groups, then making sure that the participants and/or 
properties from the two groups are directly comparable at the baseline is difficult. Thus, any 
difference observed between the two groups may be contaminated because the given scenario 
is not the only difference between the two groups (e.g. noise may come from the 
heterogeneous characteristics of properties).  
 
Fifthly, Seller.Scenario F is provided to the participants to determine whether sellers are loss 
averse. Similar to many experimental settings in psychology (e.g. Kermer et al. 2006; Paraschiv 
& Chenavaz 2011), the setting used in the current study involves degree of satisfaction serving 
as a proxy for loss–gain (L/G) utility. Equal-sized loss and gain are assigned to sellers to create 
loss and gain domains, respectively. An L/G ratio is then calculated. Participants are loss averse 
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if the L/G ratio is greater than 1. A similar approach was used by Harinck et al. (2012). 
Specifically, assuming that an individual’s utility would increase by 2 units (e.g. the degree of 
satisfaction increases from 5 to 7) for an RMB 200,000 gain, we then ask the participants how 
they would value their degree of satisfaction if they face an equal-sized loss (i.e. RMB 200,000). 
Participants are considered loss averse when their degree of satisfaction decreases to below 33. 
This scenario is included at the end of Part B in the sellers’ experiment because loss aversion is 
used as a control variable only in the analysis of the WTA–WTP disparity. The interaction 
between loss aversion and the policy instrument is beyond the scope of this study.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Part B in the buyers’ experiment is commenced by assigning the properties obtained from 
sellers’ experiment to the buyer participants. Specifically, in accordance with homebuyers’ 
housing preferences and affordability, each participant is assigned five real properties obtained 
from Stage one (sellers’ experiment) and asked to select one property to commence Part B 
(‘scenarios’). For example, if a buyer participant expresses interest in buying properties in 
Chaoyang (one of the administrative districts in Beijing) with a budget of RMB 5 million, then 
the system randomly selects five properties in Chaoyang with a list price less than or equal to 
RMB 5 million for the buyer. The system then asks the buyer to select one property to 
commence Part B of the experiment. The first four scenarios (i.e. Scenarios A to D; refer to 
Figure 1) used in the sellers’ and buyers’ experiments are the same. However, in the case of the 
latter, the maximum price that a participant is willing to pay for the property (i.e. WTP) is asked 
and recorded, with the same argument provided for the earlier case. 
 
After the assignment of the expectation-based up/down/stable market condition 
																																																						




(Buyer.Scenario D) to the home buyers, two hypothetical scenarios (Buyer.Scenarios E and F) 
with information asymmetry materials are created. In Buyer.Scenario E, homebuyers know 
limited private information but are reminded about the general latent problems of the resale 
property. Given the high level of information asymmetry, buyers may apply a discount on future 
cash flows to compensate for any uncertainty and risk. In Buyer.Scenario F, home buyers 
receive the policy instrument. Specifically, the level of information asymmetry is reduced by 
disclosing part of the private information. Home buyers are informed that the structural quality 
of the properties they are interested in is excellent, except for the quality of the cables. This 
scenario is given to all home buyers, with the same argument provided for the sellers’ 
experiment. 
 
Part C of the questionnaire is labelled ‘background information’. The questions include social 
and cultural values (Lin & Lin, 2006; Maddux et al., 2010), educational level/experience (Bao 
& Gong, 2016; Plott & Zeiler, 2005; List, 2003; 2004), income effect (He & Asami, 2014) and 
gender (Dommer & Swaminathan, 2012). All information obtained from this part is used as 
control variables in the subsequent analysis. In addition, the participants’ risk preferences are 
measured. They are asked to participate in a mock ‘speed lottery’ task (the question can be 
found in the Appendix). The design of this question is in line with that of Hanaoka, Shigeoka 
and Watanabe, (2018) who aimed to capture their participants’ risk preferences. A participant is 
more risk seeking (risk averse) if he or she spends more (less) on this ‘speed lottery’ than others 
do. 
 
Three hypotheses are then tested by comparing sellers’ WTA and buyers’ WTP obtained from 
different scenarios. For example, Hypothesis 1 is tested by using the WTA obtained from 
Seller.Scenario D and the WTP obtained from Buyer.Scenario D. The gap is labelled ‘Gap 1: 
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Information asymmetry not considered’ which is similar to the WTA–WTP disparity in previous 
WTA–WTP disparity experiments and serves as a benchmark in this study. Subsequently, Gap 
2 is calculated by subtracting the WTP of Buyer.Scenario E from the WTA of Seller.Scenario 
D, in which home sellers have information advantage, whereas buyers have little private 
information. Gap 2 can be observed from the market if a high level of information asymmetry 
exists. Gap 3 is the outcome if a policy instrument for information disclosure is in place, which 
serves as the ultimate goal. In this case, home sellers receive the signal to consider the 
discounting factor of structural defects. In the meantime, part of the private information is 
disclosed to home buyers (see Table 2 for details).  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
Beijing Housing Market 
Our experiments were conducted from January to early February 2016 in Beijing, China. The 
Chinese housing market has been particularly buoyant, especially over the last 10 years, as 
property prices in Beijing have grown considerably. The house price-to-income ratio is 
estimated to be 10.2 at the national level and 19.1 in Beijing alone. Both rates are significantly 
higher than the average rates in most Western countries but are at par with those of major 
metropolitan cities, such as London and New York. Figure 2 shows that, despite a marginal 
slowdown in the growth rate in the resale housing market in Beijing after the global financial 
crisis, the overall trend observed since 2005 has remained strongly upward. From 2005 to 2016, 
the resale housing price index in Beijing increased by more than sevenfold, from 1,019 to 
approximately 7,5004.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
																																																						
4 Source: http://fdc.fang.com/index/ErShouFangIndex.html.  
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The People’s Bank of China and the Chinese government have issued a series of monetary and 
fiscal policies since the last quarter of 2014. These policies include cutting the benchmark one-
year lending interest rate six times from 6.0% to 4.35%, cutting the required reserve ratio for 
banks five times from 20% to 17% and lowering the minimum down payment ratio for home 
purchases across different types of home buyers (e.g. first-time buyers with or without 
mortgages provided under the Housing Provident Fund and home buyers looking to move up 
the property ladder, see Figure 3).  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
The Chinese government has also lifted the long-time controversial One-Child Policy, thereby 
allowing a second child for all Chinese parents. The rapid expansion of the housing market in 
China is highly correlated with these new policies. These policies have directly (e.g. lowering 
the cost of mortgages to make buyers easily climb up the property ladder) or indirectly (e.g. 
allowing a second child boosts the demand for home upgrades) fuelled housing market 
expansion, thereby contributing to the phenomenal growth seen in recent years. 
 
If the property market in Beijing is indeed going through an ‘up’ market phase, as shown by its 
price index (Figure 2), then capital should have flowed swiftly into the housing sector. This 
situation should make the selling of properties easier than before and leads to a high trading 
volume (Fisher et al., 2003). Property prices have grown consistently over the decades, with 
all the government and central bank policies promising to stimulate the market. However, 
housing market transaction volume has not seen significant growth (Figure 4).  Transaction 
volumes between 2014 and 2016 were very volatile. Several monetary and fiscal policies have 
been observed to boost the market, but many others have proved less effective (e.g. policies 3, 
4, 6 and 11, as shown in Figure 4). Apparently, the Beijing property market is not as active as 
expected by policy makers. Home owners and home buyers seem reluctant to trade in the resale 
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housing market. Selling or buying properties is not easy, thus contradicting the prevailing ‘up’ 
market trend. The stagnation of market liquidity has been a rising concern for policy makers 
and academic scholars.  
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
Data Description 
After removing the outliers, a total of 348 complete questionnaires are collected in this study, 
with 111 coming from real home owners (on-sale properties) and 237 from home buyers. The 
properties used in the experiment cover three out of 17 administrative districts, namely, 
Chaoyang, Haidian and Fengtai (Figure 5). These areas are selected because they are the most 
popular and representative metropolitan areas in urban Beijing. As the largest administrative 
district in urban Beijing, Chaoyang accommodates most foreign embassies and 18.2% of 
residents. With more than 20% of Beijing’s GDP generated in Chaoyang, this district has the 
largest transaction volume among all administrative districts (Table 3). Haidian is the second 
largest administrative district in urban Beijing in terms of population and size. Most universities 
in Beijing and several good primary and secondary schools are located in this administrative 
district. The disposable income of Haidian’s residents ranks first among all administrative 
districts in Beijing. The trading volumes in Haidian and Fengtai account for 11.7% and 9.4% of 
the total transaction volume in Beijing, respectively. The transaction volumes in Table 3 are 
based on official statistics collected by the China Index Academy in December 2015, which 
was one month before our experiments were conducted. 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
The distribution of the properties obtained in the experiment (Figure 6) is consistent with the 
distribution of transaction volumes in Beijing (refer to the last row of Table 3), thereby 
indicating that the collected sample is representative.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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[Insert Figure 6 here] 
The buyer/property ratio of each property is not fixed and ranges from 0 to 4 (see Figure 7), 
indicating that the properties are not equally popular. The average buyer/property ratio is 2.6. 
More than 90% of the properties were selected by at least one buyer. 
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
 
Empirical Results 
Hypothesis 1: The WTA–WTP disparity exists in the housing market. 
To test whether the WTA–WTP disparity generally exists in the housing market, we stack the 
WTA obtained from Seller.Scenario D and the WTP obtained from Buyer.Scenario D to form 
a column vector which we place in a difference-in-differences framework. All WTA and WTP 
values are standardised to a base of RMB 1,000. A dummy variable Participant is included as 
an independent variable which equals 1 for sellers and 0 otherwise. A total of 12 other variables 
are included to control for the effect of the participants’ social and cultural values (e.g. Policy 
and Mkt) and demographic background (e.g. Income, Age, Gender and Edu) on WTA and WTP5. 
Hedonic housing characteristics are also included to control for the heterogeneity among 
individual properties (e.g. School). A list of variable definitions can be found in Table 4. 
Specifically, Mkt is included to control for participants’ market expectations,	and equals 1 if 
the participant has a down-market expectation. Only 4% of participants believe that the 
property price in the near future will drop. Policy equals 1 if the participant’s housing decision 
will be affected by recently introduced policies. Approximately 10% of participants indicate 
that their housing decision will be affected by recently introduced policies. Two thirds of 
participants report a household income of over RMB 11,000, and most participants have a 
																																																						
5 Loss_aversion and Affordability are included in the tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3 only. Loss_aversion is designed 
for sellers only, whereas Affordability works for buyers only. These two variables affect the gap between the WTA 
and the WTP only. In the test of Hypothesis 1, the dependent variables are the WTA and WTP values rather than 
the gap; thus Loss_aversion and Affordability are not included in this step of analysis. 	
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bachelor’s degree or higher; these characteristics are consistent with those reported by Zhang 
et al. (2016). The majority of our participants are over 28 years old, and 37% are females. 
Nearly half of the collected properties are located in the good school catchment area. Two thirds 
of the properties had been held by their owners for less than five years. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Table 5 presents the results for Hypothesis 1. The coefficient of interest is Participant. A 
positive and significant coefficient of Participant implies that the WTA of sellers is generally 
higher than the WTP of buyers. We first run a univariate analysis. It can be seen from Model 1 
in Table 5, the coefficient of Participant is statistically significantly larger than zero at the 1% 
significance level. The result of the univariate regression implies that the WTA of sellers is 
RMB 29,815 higher than the WTP of buyers (per RMB 1 million). Subsequently, 11 other 
independent variables are added in the regression analysis. Although the significance of 
Participant in Model 2 decreases, the coefficient estimation remains positive and statistically 
significant (at the 10% level, as denoted in bold in Table 5) under the control of the given 
variables. All else being equal, the sellers’ WTA is higher than the buyers’ WTP by RMB 23,072 
per RMB 1 million. This difference is independent of participants’ social and cultural values, 
demographic background and hedonic characteristics of properties. As we use the WTA (WTP) 
values obtained from Seller.Scenario D (Buyer.Scenario D), such values are formed after 
accounting for market trend (e.g. market boom or crash) and market expectations.  
  
The coefficient estimates of other significant variables are as expected. For example, housing 
market players with a bachelor’s degree or higher would have higher WTA or WTP values than 
others. The same is anticipated from the participants who work in the real estate sector. All 
estimations of coefficients reported in Table 5 are based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors and covariance. All Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistics are relatively low, 
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which indicate that the correlation among the included independent variables is low. No serious 
variance inflation and bias issues exist in the model. The results indicate that the WTA–WTP 
disparity exists in the housing market and thus support the first hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Hypothesis 2: Information asymmetry affects the WTA–WTP disparity in the housing market. 
Once the WTA–WTP disparity is confirmed, the sellers and buyers are paired according to their 
property code. This is done in order to obtain the WTA–WTP disparity of each individual 
property. The calculation of the WTA–WTP disparities is presented in Table 26. As indicated in 
Table 2, we use two WTA–WTP disparities calculated from different scenarios (i.e. Gap 1 and 
Gap 2) to facilitate the testing for Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 can be supported if Gap 2 is 
significantly larger than Gap 1 is. To test whether Gap 2 is statistically significantly larger than 
Gap 1 with other factors held constant, we stack two disparities to form a column vector (Gaps). 
We then use Gaps as the dependent variable and place it in a difference-in-differences model. 
A dummy variable Full_IA is included as the independent variable which equals 1 if the gap is 
from the high information asymmetry scenario. In addition to the independent variable included 
in the testing of Hypothesis 1, Loss_aversion, a well-established contributor to the WTA–WTP 
disparity, is incorporated to control for any endowment effect (Thaler, 1980). Buyers’ 
Affordability is also included as it might affect buyers’ WTP and the WTA–WTP disparity.  
 
Table 6 presents the results for Hypothesis 2. The coefficient of interest is Full_IA. A positive 
and significant coefficient estimation of Full_IA implies information asymmetry that enlarges 
the WTA–WTP gap. Three models are estimated to test this hypothesis. Model 1 includes basic 
																																																						
6 In the subsequent analysis, the calculation of the WTA–WTP gaps is based on the responses from Scenarios D 
to F. These calculations are based on the WTA and WTP values formed after market expectations are established. 
Scenarios A to C are included in the experiments as part of the validity and reliability checks. 
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driving forces (e.g. information asymmetry, psychological forces, market expectations and 
income effect) only. Subsequently, we control for confounding factors (e.g. age, gender, 
education and hedonic characteristics of properties) in Model 2. As the WTA–WTP gaps are 
determined by both sellers and buyers, we include the interaction terms between Participant 
and various characteristics to capture the incremental effect of being a seller in Model 37. Table 
6 shows that Model 1 has the lowest adjusted R-squared. Models 2 and 3 marginally improve 
the explanation power over Model 1. Model 3 includes the confounding factors and interaction 
terms between Participant and various characteristics with the highest goodness of fit. Hence, 
our subsequent discussions are inferred from the regression results of Model 3. The result 
indicates that information asymmetry persistently causes the WTA–WTP disparity to be RMB 
69.067 (per RMB 1000) greater than the benchmark gap is. In other words, for every RMB 1 
million, a gap of RMB 69,067 between WTA and WTP is due to information asymmetry. 
 
In addition, the gap increases by RMB 33,378 when sellers have a high degree of loss aversion. 
Sellers are reluctant to sell if they are sensitive to potential losses. The so-called endowment 
effect may be one of the explanations. Moreover, five out of nine control variables are 
significant in our model. The coefficient estimations of control variables, such as Policy, Age 
and Gender, are as expected and in line with those in previous studies. For example, 
participants who believe that recently introduced policies would benefit them exhibit a lower 
WTA–WTP gap. Two out of five interaction terms between Participant and various 
characteristics are significant in Model 3. Specifically, young sellers may exhibit a low WTA–
WTP gap in general. However, when the seller works in the real estate sector, the WTA–WTP 
gap tends to be higher (Participant*Occp = 47.822*). This finding is consistent with that of 
																																																						
7 Participant*Edu was included in our regression analysis. However, this variable is highly correlated with our 
independent variables. The VIF of Participant*Edu is as high as 25. We therefore remove Participant*Edu in the 
regression results reported here. The exclusion of Participant*Edu does not affect the loading of the coefficient 
estimations of other variables. 	
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the previous literature which indicates that real estate agents sell their own properties at prices 
higher than those of similar client-owned properties (Rutherford et al., 2007). 
 
All estimations of the coefficients are based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors and covariance. Model 3 passes the Ramsey RESET test (F-stat = 0.435, p value=	0.648) 
and is thus assumed free from omitted variable bias. All VIF statistics are less than 10 which 
indicate that the correlation among the included independent variables is low. No serious 
variance inflation and bias issues exist in the model. In summary, the regression results support 
the second hypothesis stating that when all other conditions are equal, information asymmetry 
affects the WTA–WTP disparity in the housing market.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Hypothesis 3: The release of information enables consumers to make informed decisions, 
thereby reducing the WTA–WTP disparity in the housing market. 
The effect of information asymmetry on the WTA–WTP disparity in the housing market is 
significant because of market frictions. However, the policy instrument for information 
disclosure effectively eliminates many of the effects of information asymmetry. As indicated in 
Table 2, we use the two WTA–WTP disparities calculated from different scenarios (i.e., Gap 2 
and Gap 3) to facilitate the testing for Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 can be supported if Gap 3 is 
significantly smaller than Gap 2. To test whether Gap 3 is statistically significantly smaller than 
Gap 2 whilst holding other factors constant, we again stack the two disparities to form a column 
vector (Gaps) and use Gaps as the dependent variable in a difference-in-differences model. A 
dummy variable Infor_Dis is included as the independent variable which equals 1 if the gap is 
from the information disclosure scenario. The set of independent variables and interaction terms 
used in the regression analysis is the same as that used in Model 3 in Table 6.  
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[Insert Table 7 here] 
Table 7 presents the results for Hypothesis 3. The coefficient of interest is Infor_Dis. A negative 
and significant coefficient estimation of Infor_Dis implies that the release of information 
reduces the WTA–WTP disparity. As can be seen, the release of private information reduces 
the WTA–WTP disparity by RMB 45,424 (per RMB 1 million). The coefficient estimates of 
other significant variables are as expected. All estimations of the coefficients are based on 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. The model passes the 
Ramsey RESET test (F-stat = 0.009, p value=	0.991), thereby suggesting that the model does 
not suffer from omitted variable bias. All VIF statistics are less than 10 which indicate that the 
correlation among the included independent variables is low. No serious variance inflation and 
bias issues in the model are indicated. This evidence supports the last hypothesis stating that 
the WTA–WTP disparity is significantly reduced after information disclosure. Three reasons 
explain why housing consumers may decrease their relative WTP, leading to an enlarged WTA–
WTP disparity when information gaps exist between sellers and buyers. We also provide 
illustrations on how smart disclosure helps in generating smart decision makers. The WTA–
WTP disparity decreases after information disclosure because buyers and seller may adjust 
their price. Specifically, buyers’ WTP rises for the following reasons. 
 
First, in the resale housing market, a homeowner may form a new estimation of property 
conditions (e.g. a new probability to future risk or maintenance cost) after owning the property 
for a certain period. This estimation should be more accurate than the one that the homeowner 
formed when buying the property and the one formed by potential buyers. Information 
asymmetry between owners and potential buyers then occurs endogenously. Buyers may face 
a range of uncertainties, such as any differences in future risks as perceived by buyers and 
actual future risk. To mitigate this uncertainty, potential buyers may irrationally overestimate 
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the probability and/or risk of future maintenance. Consequently, consumers may apply for a 
large discount on future cash flows to compensate for any uncertainty and risk. Thus, a low 
WTP is set which in turn widens the WTA–WTP disparity in the housing market. This 
phenomenon corroborates the uncertainty hypothesis in previous studies, that is, ambiguity 
increases the WTA–WTP disparity (Brown, 2005; Casey, 1995; Shefrin & Caldwell, 2001). 
However, a policy instrument for information disclosure reduces the ambiguity and uncertainty 
faced by housing consumers. Such information helps homebuyers adjust their judgment and 
estimation on future maintenance cost toward the direction of true probability. As a result, the 
disclosure of information on property conditions eliminates the information uncertainty caused 
by information gaps. Buyers’ WTP rises and ultimately reduces the WTA–WTP disparity. 
 
Second, decision makers usually use their own experience in the market to form and update 
any belief about the market and products. However, given the uniqueness of the housing sector, 
consumers in this market have little practice and lack experience. Hence, they would place 
greater value on information regarding market and property conditions in the housing sector 
than on the information in other markets. Housing consumers may spend more time than usual 
in searching for the information that they need through research, enquiries and visual 
inspections. The time and money that they spend on searching are likely to reduce their WTP 
(Chang et al., 2016). This explains why informed decision makers typically make smarter 
decisions than others do. For example, real estate agents sell their own properties at a price 
higher than those of similar client-owned properties (Rutherford et al., 2007). Out-of-state 
buyers tend to have lower WTP than local buyers do because of higher search cost (Chang et 
al., 2016). Home buyers are willing to increase their WTP for green housing if they are provided 
with reliable and concrete information set by the government (Zhang et al., 2016). If the supply 
side successfully meets the information requested by the demand side and if an effective 
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information exchange system between the two sides is created, then consumers can extract the 
information that may serve as signal for the informed decision-making process during property 
transactions (Lützkendorf & Speer, 2005). If the information exchange substantially saves time 
and money for consumers, then the WTP values would increase and the WTA–WTP disparity 
would be reduced. 
 
Third, resale properties are of unequal quality. Homeowners are knowledgeable about the 
conditions of their properties, whereas potential buyers face quality uncertainty. If informed 
sellers take advantage of this information asymmetry and take inappropriate actions during the 
transaction (e.g. hiding structural defects), then less-informed buyers may have to pay for the 
consequences when they face repair/maintenance bills that are heavier than expected for their 
new property. This situation is known as moral hazard. To act against information ambiguity, 
consumers may underestimate property quality and demand a high risk-premium. Hence, WTP 
is priced down. We may also observe house price drop and market efficiency loss (Izquierdo 
& Izquierdo, 2007; Brown & Gregory, 1999). Releasing information on property conditions 
helps consumers adjust the risk premium they demand. As a result, WTP values increase after 
information disclosure. 
 
Conversely, homeowners should be aware that hiding private information and setting an 
irrationally high WTA, as if their belongings are not ‘lemons’ (an American expression 
referring to inferior goods), may pose imminent risk to their properties because these houses 
may sit on the market for a long time. Therefore, such policy instrument that supports 
information disclosure also changes the behaviour of homeowners as WTA may move towards 
the market fair value. In other words, sellers’ WTA may decline and contribute to the reduction 




In addition to the variables utilised in the model specification, psychological forces (i.e. loss 
aversion) are confirmed through alternative methods (e.g. risk preference). According to 
prospect theory, loss aversion is revealed by individuals’ asymmetric behaviour in different 
domains. The asymmetry originates from the asymmetric risk preferences in the gain and loss 
domains. Specifically, individuals are risk averse in the gain domain but risk seeking in the loss 
domain. Risk-averse individuals are prone to be affected by uncertainty, which in turn makes 
them loss averse (Georgantzis & Navarro-Martnez, 2010). The results obtained from the 
question on risk preferences in the experiment are consistent with the prediction of prospect 
theory. The risk preferences of home sellers and buyers are significantly different. When 
Loss_aversion is replaced by the risk preference of buyers and sellers, the WTA–WTP disparity 
narrows if sellers are risk averse or if buyers are risk seeking. This finding is consistent with 
that of Georgantzis and Navarro–Martnez (2010).  
 
5. Conclusions 
This study examines the effect of information disclosure on the changing behaviour of housing 
consumers during transactions and discusses the dynamics of potential market outcomes. We 
conduct a field experimental investigation within the property market and find that the WTA–
WTP disparity exists. However, a policy instrument for information disclosure enables decision 
makers to update their WTA or WTP accordingly. The release of information helps consumers 
adjust their judgment and estimation on future maintenance cost towards the direction of true 
probability, reduces any time and cost spent on searching for information and corrects the high 
risk-premium they demand in buying resale properties. Informed decisions can then be made 
by housing consumers. The WTA–WTP disparity is significantly reduced after information 
disclosure. Market liquidity and efficiency can be improved. 
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Our study contributes to the academic community in the following aspects. First, we provide 
an important complement to prior research on how information can help consumers make smart 
decisions in the important but unique housing sector. Consumers in this market usually lack 
experience. Thus, understanding their information needs and how they navigate and absorb 
information in their decision-making process is important. A profound understanding of these 
issues offers insights into home purchase behaviours, smooths housing transactions and market 
exchanges.  
 
Second, we contribute to housing economics by justifying the effectiveness of information 
disclosure in housing markets from a dynamic perspective. Prior research tested how 
information disclosure affects market transaction price only. In the present study, we analyse 
the interaction between information disclosure and the WTA–WTP disparity, thereby providing 
implications not only for the final transaction price but also for housing market liquidity.  
 
Third, the design of field experiments in this study broadens the prospect of experimental 
economics and its significance in explaining individual behaviours and market phenomena. To 
the best of our knowledge, this study is amongst the first to provide field experiment evidence 
from the housing market. To ensure the internal and external validity of such experiment, we 
use actual houses on the market as the stimuli and real house owners and potential buyers as 
participants. We also include information asymmetry materials in the housing decision-making 
process, which is rarely investigated in WTA–WTP disparity research.  
 
The findings of this study can benefit all housing market players and policymakers. The 
insights gained from our research can potentially increase public awareness of the benefits and 
importance of policy instruments, such as information release. Such instruments can be 
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considered a ‘behavioural nudge’. The ‘paternalistic’ aspect of this nudge lies in the claim that 
disclosing information on property conditions that home sellers and real estate agents plan to 
sell is regulated or mandated. By contrast, the ‘libertarian’ aspect of this nudge lies in the fact 
that even after information disclosure, home sellers and buyers are free to set their WTA and 
WTP and opt out of undesirable scenarios.  
 
The findings can also inform the central government about the wide use of smart disclosure in 
the future, as well as the scope, format and structure of information to be supplied to general 
housing consumers. Nowadays, decision makers are sometimes confronted with important but 
complicated information. People cannot always absorb all information and decide easily. 
Therefore, policymakers should make sure that information is disclosed smartly so that the 
public can easily understand and use it. Information on housing structural defects, as tested in 
this study, is regarded as one type of smart information that assists consumers in making 
informed purchase decisions. Future research can be conducted on the basis of this study by 
testing how decision makers respond to the release of other key information (e.g. historical 
prices, school quality and environmental dis-amenities). In addition, the format used in 
supplying information to decision makers is important in the process of smart disclosure. A 
policy instrument used to release different information might not be introduced in one go. In 
our field experiment, we ask participants to provide a response (i.e. WTA or WTP value) after 
each scenario is provided to them. The results from two sample t-tests show that home sellers 
and buyers adequately absorb information and update their WTA and WTP when new 
information is given. Future studies may examine whether the same conclusion can be drawn 
if all pieces of information (e.g. current price, historical price and structural defects, etc.) are 





Materials and scenarios in Stage one (sellers’ experiment) 
 
Firstly, owner participants are told the following: ‘The instrument used in this experiment is 
the property that you want to sell, so you will act as a home seller’. Scenarios are then provided.  
 
Home sellers are initially given current market information (Seller.Scenario A). 
 
Seller: Q20. (Scenario A): If you are aware that the current market price of a property in 
the same neighbourhood with a similar unit type ranges from (Min) to (Max) and the 
average price is (Avg), then what is the minimum price you can accept for your property? 
 
The given average price and price range of a property are based on big data of the resale housing 
market in Beijing and linked to the official statistics collected by the China Index Academy. For 
example, if the property owned by a participant is located on Xueyuan Road (a neighbourhood) 
in Haidian (an administrative district in Beijing), then the scenario that he or she receives is as 
follows: ‘If you are aware that the current market price of a property in the same district with 
a similar unit type ranges from RMB 3.8 million to RMB 5.8 million, and the average price is 
RMB 4.7 million, then what is the minimum price you can accept for your property?’8 
 
Secondly, historical information, such as the prices two and four years ago, are provided in the 
second and third scenarios, respectively. The prices with an underscore (e.g. RMB 4 million in 
Seller.Scenario B and RMB 3.1 million in Seller.Scenario C) are calculated according to the 
current average price and corresponding increase rate.  
 
Seller: Q21. (Scenario B): If you are aware that compared with the price two years ago, 
the current market price has increased by 15% (the price two years ago was RMB 4 
million), then what is the minimum price you can accept for your property? 
 
Seller: Q22. (Scenario C): If you are aware that compared with the price four years ago, 
the current market price has increased by 50% (the price four years ago was RMB 3.1 
million), then what is the minimum price you can accept for your property? 
 
Thirdly, the following expectation-based up/down/stable market scenario is given to the 
participants.  
 
Seller: Q23. What is your expectation regarding the property market in Beijing? 
1. The property price will continue to increase (go to Q24–26). 
2. The property price will become stable (go to Q27–29). 
3. The property price will decrease by a small scale (go to Q30–32). 
 
For example, if a participant has an up-market expectation in mind, then an up-market scenario 
(see below) is assigned to him or her.  
 
Seller: Q24. (Scenario D): If you are aware that the property price will continue to 







Fourthly, the following hypothetical scenario is given to home sellers:  
 
Seller: Q25. (Scenario E): Suppose that the cables used for the initial internal decoration 
in your residential area were of mediocre quality. They have not been changed, and they 
were not replaced when you renovated your property. If these potentially undesirable 
characteristics are considered, then what is the minimum price that you can accept for 
your property? 
 
Fifthly, the following scenario is provided to the participants to determine whether sellers are 
loss averse.  
 
Seller: Q26. (Scenario F): On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the highest degree of 
satisfaction and 1 being the lowest degree of satisfaction, suppose that the buyers’ bid 
price is RMB 200,000 higher than the minimum value you are willing to accept for your 
property and that your degree of satisfaction is 7. 
 
If buyers’ bid price and your minimum willingness to accept are identical, then your 
degree of satisfaction drops to 5. 
 
If the buyers’ bid price is RMB 200,000 lower than the minimum value you are willing 
to accept, how do you value your degree of satisfaction? 
   1 
   2  
   3 
   4  
   5 or higher  
 
Materials and scenarios in Stage two (buyers’ experiment) 
 
Buyer.Scenarios A to D are the same as the ones used in the sellers’ experiment, except that in 
the case of the buyers’ experiment, the maximum price that the participant is willing to pay for 
the property (i.e. WTP) is asked and recorded, with the same argument provided for the earlier 
case. 
 
After the assignment of the expectation-based up/down/stable market condition 
(Buyer.Scenario D) to the home buyers, two hypothetical scenarios (Buyer.Scenarios E and F) 
with information asymmetry materials are created.  
 
Buyer: Q21. (Scenario E): Suppose that you learned from an experienced home buyer 
that various uncertainties (e.g. latent problems) and problems (e.g. aging problems of 
cables, leaking pipes, blockage of drains and cracks on the wall) might be encountered 
in the future and these latent problems may cause future expenses. With these issues in 
mind, what is the maximum price that you are willing to pay for the property?  
 
Buyer: Q22. (Scenario F): Suppose that a friend, who is in charge of the initial internal 
decoration in this residential area, has informed you that the quality of the structure in 
this area is generally excellent. The only concern might be the cables, which are of 
mediocre quality. What is the maximum price that you are willing to pay for the property?  
 




Q. Risk preference: Suppose that you have a chance to take part in a ‘speed lottery’ 
which gives you a 50% chance of winning RMB 1,000. If you win, then you will instantly 
receive the prize. If you lose, then you will receive nothing. How much will you spend to 
buy a ticket for this lottery?  
 
 RMB 1     
 RMB 20     
 RMB 40     
 RMB 80     
 RMB 150      
 RMB 250     
 RMB 350     
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Table 1. Number of questions for each participant in each part 




Part A –“identification” 19 15 
Part B –“scenarios” 7 7 
Part C –“background information” 10 10 
 
 
Table 2. Calculation of WTA–WTP gaps 
Calculation Label H1 H2 H3 
Seller.Scenario D minus Buyer.Scenario D Gap 1: Information asymmetry is not considered  × ×  
Seller.Scenario D minus Buyer.Scenario E Gap 2: A high level of information asymmetry 
exists. 
 × × 
Seller.Scenario E minus Buyer.Scenario F Gap 3: Private information is disclosed   × 
     
 
Table 3. Summary of the statistics of Beijing and selected administrative areas9 
 Beijing Chaoyang Haidian Fengtai 
Population (10,000) 2114.8 384.1 357.6 226.1 
GDP (billion) 1950.06 396.36 383.52 100.78 
Disposable income (RMB) 40321 41035 45953 37886 







Table 4. Variable definition  
Variable  Definition Mean SD 
Participant =1 if seller; 0 if otherwise  0.500 0.501 
Mkt =1 if participant has a down-market expectation; 
0 if otherwise 
0.044 0.206 
Income =1 if participant’s income>11,000 RMB; 0 if 
otherwise 
0.688 0.464 
Affordability Maximum amount that homebuyers can afford (in 
RMB) 3,964,346 1,105,866 
Policy =1 if participant’s housing decision will be 
affected by the recently introduced policies; 0 if 
otherwise 
0.122 0.328 
Age =1 if participant is under 28 years old; 0 if 
otherwise 
0.112 0.315 
Gender =1 if participant is female; 0 if otherwise 0.371 0.484 
Edu =1 if participant has a bachelor’s degree or above; 
0 if otherwise 
0.920 0.272 
Occp =1 if participant is in the real estate sector; 0 if 
otherwise 
0.137 0.344 
School =1 if property is in a good school catchment area; 
0 if otherwise 0.468 
0.500 
Haidian =1 if property is in Haidian; 0 if otherwise 0.283 0.451 
Chaoyang =1 if property is in Chaoyang; 0 if otherwise 0.637 0.481 
Holding =1 if seller’s holding period is less than five 
years; 0 if otherwise 
0.646 0.479 





Table 5 Regression results for H1 
This table presents regression results for H1. To test whether WTA–WTP disparity generally exists in the 
housing market, we stack WTA and WTP to form a column vector and place it in a difference-in-differences 
framework. The dependent variable is WTA obtained from Seller.Scenario D and WTP obtained from 
Buyer.Scenario D.  
A dummy variable Participant is included as an independent variable, which equals 1 for sellers and 0 if 
otherwise. Mkt=1 if participant has a down-market expectation; 0 if otherwise. Income =1 if participant’s 
income>11,000 RMB; 0 if otherwise. Policy=1 if participant’s housing decision will be affected by the recently 
introduced policies; 0 if otherwise. Age =1 if participant is under 28 years old; 0 if otherwise. Gender=1 if 
participant is female; 0 if otherwise. Edu=1 if participant has a bachelor’s degree or above; 0 if otherwise. 
Occp=1 if participant is in the real estate sector; 0 if otherwise. School =1 if property is in a school catchment 
area; 0 if otherwise. Haidian =1 if property is in Haidian; 0 if otherwise. Chaoyang =1 if property is in 
Chaoyang; 0 if otherwise. Holding =1 if seller’s holding period is less than five years; 0 if otherwise. The 
coefficient of interest is Participant. A positive and significant coefficient of Participant implies the WTA of 
sellers is generally higher than the WTP of buyers.  
***p < 1%, **p < 5%, *p < 10% 






c 985.126*** 940.030*** --- 
Participant 29.815*** 23.072* 1.071 
Mkt  -54.541 1.102 
Income  -17.889 1.194 
Policy  23.097 1.188 
Age  -7.237 1.101 
Gender  -14.405 1.144 
Edu  85.530*** 1.124 
Occp  30.240* 1.142 
School  -2.478 1.174 
Haidian  30.146 3.734 
Chaoyang  -57.740** 3.650 
Holding  20.330 1.284 
Adj R2 0.856% 9.872% 





Table 6. Regression results for H2 
This table presents regression results for H2. Two gaps calculated from different scenarios are stacked to form a column 
vector (Gaps). We then use Gaps as the dependent variable and placed it in a difference-in-differences model. Full_IA 
= 1 if the gap is in a scenario with a high level of information asymmetry; 0 if otherwise. Loss_aversion = 1 if seller is 
loss averse; 0 if otherwise.  
A dummy variable Participant is included as an independent variable, which equals 1 for sellers and 0 if otherwise. 
Mkt=1 if participant has a down-market expectation; 0 if otherwise. Income =1 if participant’s income>11,000 RMB; 
0 if otherwise. Affordability measures the maximum amount that homebuyers can afford. Policy=1 if participant’s 
housing decision will be affected by the recently introduced policies; 0 if otherwise. Age =1 if participant is under 28 
years old; 0 if otherwise. Gender=1 if participant is female; 0 if otherwise. Edu=1 if participant has a bachelor’s degree 
or above; 0 if otherwise. Occp=1 if participant is in the real estate sector; 0 if otherwise. School =1 if property is in a 
school catchment area; 0 if otherwise. Haidian =1 if property is in Haidian; 0 if otherwise. Chaoyang =1 if property is 
in Chaoyang; 0 if otherwise. Holding =1 if seller’s holding period is less than five years; 0 if otherwise. The coefficient 
of interest is Full_IA. A positive and significant coefficient of Full_IA implies information asymmetry enlarges the 
WTA-WTP gap. 
***p < 1%, **p < 5%, *p < 10% 








c 25.023 44.322 50.545 --- 
Full_IA 69.067*** 69.067*** 69.067*** 1.023 
Loss_aversion 28.589*** 36.145*** 33.378*** 1.506 
Participant 4.738 11.911 22.838* 2.136 
Mkt -86.384*** -87.059*** -56.314 3.125 
Income  -50.639*** -39.435*** -45.934*** 1.214 
Affordability 0.071 0.102** 0.099** 1.309 
Policy  -35.163** -49.160* 5.149 
Age  15.228 50.602** 2.148 
Gender  23.409** 31.965** 2.116 
Edu  -32.129 -36.342 1.171 
Occp  7.424 -15.849 2.108 
School  18.819* 21.804** 1.386 
Haidian  -46.178** -48.373** 5.025 
Chaoyang  -20.907 -25.580 4.938 
Holding  -8.424 -4.877 1.281 
Participant*Mkt   -15.505 3.848 
Participant*Policy   26.222 5.635 
Participant*Age   -92.168*** 2.951 
Participant*Gender   -30.720 2.692 
Participant*Occp   47.822* 2.213 
Adj R2 8.616% 10.151% 10.933% 




Table 7. Regression results for H3 
This table presents regression results for H3. Two gaps calculated from different scenarios are stacked to form a 
column vector (Gaps). We then use Gaps as the dependent variable and placed it in a difference-in-differences model. 
Infor_Dis=1 if the gap is obtained from the scenario after private information is disclosed; 0 if otherwise. 
Loss_aversion = 1 if seller is loss averse; 0 if otherwise.  
A dummy variable Participant is included as an independent variable, which equals 1 for sellers and 0 if otherwise. 
Mkt=1 if participant has a down-market expectation; 0 if otherwise. Income =1 if participant’s income>11,000 RMB; 
0 if otherwise. Affordability measures the maximum amount that homebuyers can afford. Policy=1 if participant’s 
housing decision will be affected by the recently introduced policies; 0 if otherwise. Age =1 if participant is under 28 
years old; 0 if otherwise. Gender=1 if participant is female; 0 if otherwise. Edu=1 if participant has a bachelor’s 
degree or above; 0 if otherwise. Occp=1 if participant is in the real estate sector; 0 if otherwise. School =1 if property 
is in a school catchment area; 0 if otherwise. Haidian =1 if property is in Haidian; 0 if otherwise. Chaoyang =1 if 
property is in Chaoyang; 0 if otherwise. Holding =1 if seller’s holding period is less than five years; 0 if otherwise. 
The coefficient of interest is Infor_Dis. A negative and significant coefficient of Infor_Dis implies that the release of 
information reduces the WTA-WTP gap.  
***p < 1%, **p < 5%, *p < 10% 
Variable Coefficient VIF 
c 85.298** --- 
Infor_Dis -45.424*** 1.025 
Loss_aversion 28.449** 1.489 
Participant 26.003* 2.153 
Mkt -87.382* 3.684 
Income  -41.092*** 1.141 
Affordability 0.158*** 1.296 
Policy -37.436 4.811 
Age 71.682*** 2.280 
Gender 42.749*** 2.085 
Edu -23.668 1.160 
Occp -22.012 2.193 
School 10.652 1.331 
Haidian -52.255** 4.851 
Chaoyang -19.493 4.789 
Holding -13.626 1.193 
Participant*Mkt 29.051 4.520 
Participant*Policy 31.224 5.396 
Participant*Age -125.798*** 3.118 
Participant*Gender -32.870 2.712 
Participant*Occp 33.692 2.382 







(a) Procedures of Stage one (sellers’ experiment) 
 
(b) Procedures of Stage two (buyers’ experiment) 
Figure 1. Experimental procedures 
 
 














Figure 3. Policies on the down payment ratio 
	
 
Figure 4. Trading volume in the re-sale housing market in Beijing alone and in 
representative cities of China10 (2010--2016) 
																																																						





Figure 5. Selected administrative districts for the field experiment 
 
 






Figure 7. Buyer/Property ratio 
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